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Delusion or Despair:
The Concept of Limited Admissibility
in the Law of Evidence
Daniel D. Blinkat
I. Introduction
The modern law of evidence is characterized by the prin-
ciple of "assumptive admissibility."1 Its hallmark is a strong
bias toward the broad admission of all testimony, documents
or other exhibits that bear upon the dispute being litigated.
Assumptive admissibility depends, in theory and practice, on
the idea of limited admissibility; that is, the admission of
evidence for certain restricted purposes.2 The theory of lim-
ited admissibility is given effect at trial through the practice
of reading limiting instructions to the jury.
The theory, however, clashes with the practice. As pres-
ently conceived, limited admissibility "works" only because
of a legal fiction which postulates that the jury follows
whatever instruction the court gives. Modern evidence law,
therefore, is based to a large degree on the delusion, or illu-
sion, that juries are able to adhere to instructions that tell
them what to do with certain evidence. Despair arises be-
cause it is widely recognized that juries cannot follow these
directives.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A., 1975,
University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee); J.D., 1978, University of Wisconsin Law
School.
1. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 33-34 (2d ed.
1987).
2. Id. at 33.
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A. Assumptive Admissibility
The principle of assumptive admissibility evolved slowly
over the last several hundred years. At its inception in the
seventeenth century, the law of evidence clearly 'epresented
a more rational process than its medieval antecedents, such
as trial by compurgation or the ordeal. The law of evidence
did not, however, spring fully developed from the mind of
any great thinker. It developed over time. The early rules
were rigid, exclusionary rules which possessed a black and
white quality about them.
At common law, for example, the competency rule pre-
cluded any testimony by convicted felons or parties to the
action. Evidence was either admissible or inadmissible.' As
the absolute rules of exclusion began withering away in the
nineteenth century, they were gradually replaced with rules
which worked a balance between the concerns that had jus-
tified the total exclusion and those which favored putting
the maximum amount of information before the trier of
fact.4 This was the genesis of the doctrine of limited admis-
3. Ladd, The Relationship of the Principles of Exclusionary Rules of Evidence
to the Problem of Proof, 18 MINN. L. REV. 506, 508 (1934). Professor Ladd also
observed:
By the beginning of the nineteenth century most of the rules were es-
tablished. Extreme exclusion of testimony and a wide field of privilege
and incompetency of witnesses generally prevailed. The nineteenth
century championed the adversary system. Rules of evidence were ac-
cepted with little question; they obtained the highest professional rev-
erence. There were a number of statutory changes, to be sure, and
courts at times re-examined existing law, but by and large existing
authority in the law of evidence was sustained and many new exclu-
sionary rules were created in this period when limitation and restric-
tion flourished at the expense of a great loss of evidence which would
materially assist in the determination of factual disputes. It was an age
of rule-ism and not realism but was soon to yield to the introspective
era of the next century.
Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 329, 334 (1942)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE].
4. According to Professor Ladd:
The spirit of [recent case law] further aligns the federal courts with
the modern tendency in the field of evidence to remove barriers to the
[Vol. 13:781
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sibility: the idea that evidence may be received for certain
evidentiary purposes, but not for others.
In implementing the rule of limited admissibility, the
modern law of evidence is wrestling with medieval demons.
The doctrine is modern and rational in the sense that it rec-
ognizes that evidence should not be withheld from the jury
simply because they may draw from it impermissible infer-
ences. The idea, however, is implemented in ritualistic fash-
ion. To ensure that the jury does not misuse the evidence,
the judge reads an incantation known as the limiting in-
struction. The limiting instruction, coupled with the pre-
sumption that the jury follows all of the court's instructions,
has been charitably labelled by Wigmore as an "exercise in
faith." 5 This raises the question: What room is there in a
modern, rational system of evidence for medieval dogma?
B. Limited Admissibility
The Federal Rules of Evidence are largely based on the
idea of multiple admissibility and its corollary, limited ad-
missibility. 6 Although the doctrine is widely accepted, the
reception has not been cheerful. Criticisms of the doctrine in
admissibility of testimony and competency of witnesses in the desire to
place before the trier of fact all relevant testimony and to permit the
reasons which formerly established exclusionary rules now to be used
to test credibility and to aid to evaluating testimony.
Ladd, supra note 3, at 507. For a less sanguine view by commentators writing at
about the same time, see Morgan & McGuire, Looking Backward and Forward at
Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1937). See also Waltz, Judicial Discretion in
the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1097, 1118 (1985) ("One still senses that more evidentiary material is being
turned over to the factfinder under the Federal Rules of Evidence than would have
been in cases tried at common law.").
5. 1 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 696 (Tillers Rev. 1983); see infra
text accompanying note 60.
6. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EV-
IDENCE § 5063, at 307 (1977) ("Given the nature of the concept of relevance, it is
inevitable that it will raise issues of multiple-admissibility. Relevance is the rela-
tionship between an item of proof and the issues in the case; it is not an inherent
quality of the evidence.").
1989]
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its specific applications have been pervasive, caustic and
ever increasing. The crux of the controversy focuses not so
much on the doctrine itself, but on its reduction to concrete
form in jury instructions covering specific evidentiary
problems. The piercing cry of the critics is invariably that
the jury cannot possibly understand, grasp or follow such
instructions.7 Repeated throughout the critics' literature is
the observation that the jury instruction cannot silence the
bell following the "reverberating clang" of the evidence.8
The tradition of evidence law in this country recognizes
and defends the idea of multiple admissibility. It accepts the
notion that an item of evidence may be used to prove many
different propositions. When the rules of evidence forbid
certain propositions, the jury may still receive the evidence
if it is relevant for a different, but permissible, purpose.
Stated in the abstract, there are few quarrels with the wis-
dom or efficacy of the doctrine of limited admissibility.
When the abstraction is reduced to a concrete, specific ap-
plication in the form of a jury instruction, however, the cry
is raised that it is a bogus fiction because the jury cannot
possibly perform this mental gymnastic. The criticism is not
limited to those instances where it is felt that the limiting
instruction was so ineffectual that the evidence should have
been excluded. Rather, many critics doubt that jurors can or
7. According to one analysis:
[T]here are serious problems that inhere in all limiting instructions:
The complexity and subtlety of most limiting instructions inevitably
raise the question whether jurors are likely to understand and appreci-
ate the instructions; even if jurors understand a limiting instruction,
the instruction has the undesirable effect of increasing the complexity
of the jurors' already complex task; and finally, it is at best questiona-
ble whether even conscientious, understanding jurors are capable of
performing the mental gymnastics that a limiting instruction requires.
R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, AN ANALYTIC APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 747 (1989); see
also Steele & Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communi-
cate, 67 N.C.L. REv. 77 (1988), reprinted in 38 DEF. L.J. 427 (1989).
8. See, e.g., 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5062, at 304, 308.
[Vol. 13:781
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will follow the court's limiting instructions, thus effecting
virtually all applications of the doctrine.9
It is not surprising that this criticism has focused on the
jury's ability to follow the limiting instructions. It must also
be remembered, however, that the jury is not alone in the
courtroom. The jury represents but one of three critical
players in the trial system; the other two are the trial judge
and the attorneys. For all the lamentations over the jury's
capacity to grasp the distinctions purportedly explained in
the limiting instructions, there is virtually no focus on the
capacity of the trial judge or the lawyers to use the evidence
for its limited purpose. An additional issue, therefore, is
whether some of the lines drawn between admissible and
inadmissible purposes are valid or only chimerical. Because
the judge and more importantly the lawyers are also obli-
gated to adhere to the limited purpose for which the evi-
dence was received, the doctrine of limited admissibility is
as much a "lawyer control device" as it is a jury control
device. Thus, it is important to consider how lawyers use
evidence and evidentiary rules at trial.10
9. See infra text accompanying note 65. Some commentators are more opti-
mistic about the ability of juries to follow limiting instructions:
To exclude evidence of mixed admissibility entirely in jury cases would
hardly be appropriate since its exclusion might well deny the jury ac-
cess to facts which are essential for reaching a reasonably accurate
decision. To allow only its general admission as an alternative to exclu-
sion would, in many cases, preclude the possibility that the trier will
base its decision on facts which are rationally probative. Admittedly a
compromise, limited admissibility offers an acceptable, if not com-
pletely satisfactory means of allowing the trier to consider the maxi-
mum amount of evidence with the minimum risk that it will use the
evidence improperly.
I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 105[02], at 105-12
(1986) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE].
10. See infra text accompanying notes 40-41. Objections at trial are infrequent
occurrences. A postulate of the law of evidence is that a failure to object amounts
to a "waiver." Lawyers frequently fail to object either because they do not see the
evidentiary problems in time to preserve the error or because an objection would
be tactically unwise. If trials were final examinations in an evidence course, the
typical grade would be low, assuming the idea was to object on all possible occa-
sions. The trial practice grade, however, might be extremely high.
1989l
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Accordingly, a full appreciation of limited admissibility
demands an excursion into the workings of evidence law at
trial. This entails a consideration of how evidence rules ac-
tually operate during the presentation of proof before a jury.
One must consider not only the text of the rules and the
case law construing them, but also how lawyers "use" the
rules at trial. Academic writing has excelled in giving a
technical exegesis of most rules, but has largely ignored any
inquiry into how the rules actually function in a trial. Sim-
ply scrutinizing appellate cases for evidentiary problems
presents a stilted view of what happens at trial. One of the
subsidiary goals of this Article is to promote more discus-
sion regarding how the rules of evidence are actually used,
or ignored, at trial. It is this author's belief that the failure
to examine how the rules are implemented at trial repre-
sents a serious lacuna in evidence scholarship.
Part IV of this Article explores the criticism of limited
admissibility that has been lodged by psychologists and so-
cial scientists who study the workings of juries. This is fol-
lowed by a survey of the legal profession's own critique of
the doctrine as illustrated by the subjects of prior bad act
evidence, the definition of hearsay, and the use of "inadmis-
sible" evidence as a basis for expert opinion.
Finally, part V suggests a rethinking of the concept of
limited admissibility and the revision of its implementation
at trial. This section offers the observation that the real
value of limited admissibility is its role in bridging the gap
between older exclusionary rules and an effort to devise
rules of proof which will aid the trier of fact in reaching a
decision.
In essence, this Article contends that limited admissibility
should be conceptualized as dealing with the problem of
proof, not the issue of admissibility. Accordingly, jury in-
structions should be rewritten, when possible, in a way that
helps the jury analyze the reliability of the evidence re-
ceived. Moreover, because limited admissibility directly im-
[Vol. 13:781
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plicates what lawyers can do with evidence during argu-
ment, it is necessary to take a different attitude and
approach toward closing arguments to ensure that lawyers
do not defeat the court's admission of evidence for a re-
stricted purpose. In the process of revising jury instructions
and rethinking the process of closing argument, one may de-
cide that certain distinctions that have been drawn are not
worth saving and should be abandoned. Although tentative,
these suggestions are necessary if the judiciary is to treat
the evidentiary rules governing admissibility seriously.
II. Relevancy, Multiple Admissibility
and the Rules of Evidence
The doctrine of multiple admissibility is well entrenched
in modern evidence law.'1 Wigmore described the practice
as follows:
11. Federal Rule of Evidence 105 accords with modern evidentiary theory that,
as a general rule, evidence should be received if it is admissible for any purpose,
notwithstanding the fact that it may be inadmissible for another. As Wigmore
teaches:
[Wihen an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose and becomes
admissible by satisfying all the rules applicable to it in that capacity, it
is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it
in some other capacity and because the jury might improperly consider
it in the latter capacity.
1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, at 694. Furthermore, Weinstein's analy-
sis of Rule 105 notes:
[TIhe rule represents a compromise between two competing interests:
the desire to admit all relevant evidence and the recognition that ajury composed of twelve untrained triers of fact may not, in the ab-
sence of some control by the judge over the evidence presented, accu-
rately assess its probative value or confine its use of the evidence to its
proper legal scope. Limiting instructions have become more important
since the distinct tendency of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to ad-
mit rather than exclude. . . . It is assumed that the more information
available to the trier of fact, the greater will be its knowledge of the
events in question and the more likely will it be that a resolution of the
factual disputes will approximate the truth.
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 9, 105[02], at 105-11; see also 21 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, §§ 5062, 5063.
19891
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In a very real sense the entire structure of the modern
law of evidence rests on the specialized and limited use
of evidence. The ability to extract a particular meaning
from a piece of evidence is what permits courts to select
the evidence that bears on legal issues, and it is that
same ability, of course, that permits courts to exclude
evidence that does not bear on a disputed fact of conse-
quence. The principle that evidence may be admitted
only for a particular purpose is merely a corollary of
this view that evidence should focus (in a proper man-
ner) on matters in issue."
In essence, the doctrine involves the commonplace observa-
tion that multiple inferences can be drawn from any item of
evidence. 13 When only some of the inferences are pertinent,
the evidence should be used only for those purposes.
The concept of relevance in modern evidence codes en-
shrines this view.' 4 In particular, the definition of "rele-
vance" in Federal Rule of Evidence 401 is one which con-
templates the use of circumstantial evidence, that is,
evidence from which inferences must be drawn.' 5 Moreover,
it sets forth a low threshold of admissibility which is calcu-
lated to admit all evidence that may "rationally" bear upon
the dispute. This definition of relevance is the very heart of
12. 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, at 695.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 30-38.
The fact that a person owns a gun may show that he had the capacity
to commit armed robbery, but it may also be taken as evidence that he
is (a) frightened, (b) Republican, (c) revolutionary, or (d) an off-duty
police officer. Thus any time the proponent can construct a chain of
inferences leading to an issue in the case, the opponent can usually
construct competing inferences that lead nowhere, or to facts inadmis-
sible but prejudicial to his client. In each case, the judge must balance
the remoteness of these varying inferences in deciding whether a prob-
lem of multiple admissibility exists.
21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5063, at 307.
14. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5063, at 307.
15. See infra note 31.
[Vol. 13:781
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the system of evidence law constructed by the Federal Rules
of Evidence and has been embraced by over thirty states.'6
In order to appreciate the workings of limited admissibil-
ity, it is necessary to first examine how the "relevance rules"
function in Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A. Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Limited Admissibility
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 through 403 are the heart
of this system of evidence law. Together they implement an
evidentiary scheme that places a premium on the admission
of a wide range of evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence
represent an attitude which may be characterized as: "when
in doubt, let it in for whatever it is worth."
Rules 401 through 403 function as the gatekeeper of ad-
missibility. Regardless of whatever other technical objec-
tions may be lodged against the evidence, all evidence is
subject to scrutiny under those rules.17
Rule 402 posits the virtual truism that all relevant evi-
dence is admissible, subject to other rules, and that all irrel-
evant evidence is inadmissible. It is given operative effect by
the definition of relevance found in Rule 401.
This definition broadly declares that evidence is relevant
if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."' 8 Relevance, then, depends upon an assessment of
two relationships: (1) the relationship between the proposi-
tion for which the evidence is offered and the ultimate issues
16. 1 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL
RULES IN THE STATES at xxv (1989).
17. The principal exception is Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which governs im-
peachment by prior conviction. The Supreme Court has held that Rule 609 is not
governed by Rule 403 balancing. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
__ 109 S. Ct. 1981, 104 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989).
18. FED. R. EVID. 401.
19891
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in the case, and (2) whether the evidence has any tendency
to make that proposition more or less likely. These consider-
ations will each be discussed in turn. 19
Relevance first requires a determination of whether the
proposition the evidence is offered to prove is "of conse-
quence" to the determination of the action. This require-
ment embraces those matters that were formerly covered by
the common law notion of "materiality.
20
The concern is not that each item of evidence relates di-
rectly to an ultimate issue in the case, but rather that it at
least be a link in a chain leading to an ultimate issue. For
example, proof that the defendant and the murder victim
quarrelled shortly before the killing is relevant to prove mo-
tive. Although motive itself is not an element of the offense
of murder, it in turn may be probative of the identity of the
murderer or the intent to kill.2' Both of these propositions
are ultimate issues in a murder prosecution, and motive is
19. It is this latter sense of "relevance" that is addressed in this Article.
[R]elevance is the heart of what Thayer has called the "excluding
function" of our system of evidence. We could have a rational system
of proof without the opinion rule or the hearsay rule, but the rule ex-
cluding evidence that is irrelevant serves to restrict the scope of the
inquiry to some finite sphere and thus to make decisions more predict-
able. Relevance is a relationship between the evidence offered and the
fact it is supposed to prove. Notice that because the substantive law
and the rules of pleading restrict the facts that are provable in the
case, an item of proof may be excluded as irrelevant for two quite
different reasons. First, the evidence may be perfectly satisfactory as
proof of the fact to which it is directed yet be excluded because that
fact is not a material fact in the case. Some lawyers and courts refer to
evidence which is irrelevant in this sense as being "immaterial." Sec-
ond, the evidence may be directed at a material fact but may not have
any value as proof of that fact.
22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §
5162, at 18 (1978 & Supp. 1989) (citations omitted).
20. Id. § 5164, at 43.
21. A defendant's motive, if narrowly defined to exclude recognized defenses
and the "specific intent" requirements of some crimes, is not relevant the substan-
tive side of the criminal law. On the procedural side, a motive for committing a
crime is relevant in proving guilt when the evidence of guilt is circumstantial, and
a good motive may result in leniency by those who administer the criminal process.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6(b), at 231 (2d ed. 1986).
[Vol. 13:781
HeinOnline  -- 13 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 790 1989-1990
LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY
circumstantial evidence of identity or intent. In short, mo-
tive, identity and intent are all consequential facts even
though all three are not elements, or ultimate issues, of the
offense. Thus, Rule 401 plainly contemplates the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence at trial.
The second aspect of the definition of relevancy looks to
the relationship between the evidence and the proposition it
is offered to prove. Here the concern is whether the evidence
actually has some tendency to prove the proposition for
which it is offered. The assessment is based on everyday rea-
soning and common-sense. This assessment is not rigidly de-
ductive in form, nor is it something which can be divined by
reading the entrails found in the case law.22 Relevancy re-
quires only that the judge conclude that the evidence has
some tendency to make the proposition more or less proba-
ble.23 The judge need not be convinced by the evidence or
even be prepared to draw the inference himself. Indeed, the
evidence may give rise to a variety of inferences for which
the proffered purpose is only one, and perhaps not even the
most compelling. 4 The judge may even admit it believing,
or hoping, that the jury will cast the evidence aside because
it is simply wrong or a falsehood. The relevancy threshold,
22. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 9, 1 401[01], at 401-10 (1989).
23. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5165; WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 9, 401 [01], at 401-11 (1986).
Somewhat akin, although perhaps not usually thought of as an aspect
of discretion, is the recognition that the judge's own experience and
conceptions, rather than legal precedents, furnish the basis for some
determination. . . . Thayer also realized that "the law furnishes no
test of relevancy" and that the judge in making his determination must
be allowed flexibility in drawing on his own experience to evaluate the
probabilities on which relevancy turns. Rule 401, by furnishing no
standards for the determination of relevancy, implicitly recognizes that
questions of relevancy cannot be resolved by mechanical resort to legal
formulae.
Id.
24. Herasimchuk, The Relevancy Revolution In Criminal Law: A Practical
Tour Through The Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 737,
754 (1989).
1989]
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then, is an exceedingly low one that is intended to admit all
evidence that may shed light on, or inform the trier of fact
about, the controversy. 5
The expansive definition of relevance is somewhat tem-
pered by Rule 403, which gives the judge discretionary
power to exclude relevant evidence. It provides: "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence."2 The Rule 403 balancing test
is skewed heavily in favor of admissibility. Only where the
probative value of the relevant evidence is substantially out-
weighed by countervailing factors may it be excluded.27 The
factors themselves are organized according to various "dan-
gers" that may affect the accuracy of the truth-determining
function of the trial and certain "considerations" which re-
late to judicial efficiency. 8
25. 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 9, 401[07], at 401-09 (1986).
In short, the test of relevancy is whether a reasonable man might be-
lieve the probability of the truth of the consequential fact to be differ-
ent if he knew of the proffered evidence. The 'probabilities are deter-
mined [in the usual case] in a most subjective and unscientific way
• . .according to the trier's limited experience.' Precise attempts to fix
probabilities in quantitative form are usually impossible because of the
absence of adequate experimental data.
Id. (notes omitted).
26. FED. R. EVID. 403.
27. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5214, at 263 ("Unless the
judge concludes that the probative worth of the evidence is 'substantially out-
weighed' by one or more of the countervailing factors, there is no discretion to
exclude; the evidence must be admitted."); Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to
Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59, 64 (1984) [hereinafter
Judicial Discretion]; Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations On The
Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497 (1983).
28. In the original scheme of Rule 403, exclusions of evidence were mandatory
when any of the three "dangers" were present, but discretionary when the "consid-
erations" were involved. This framework was scrapped in favor of the present rule,
which is entirely discretionary. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 18,
§ 5211, at 245-46.
[Vol. 13:781
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The "dangers" set forth in Rule 403 revolve around fears
that the jury might be confused, misled, or give undue
weight to certain items of evidence. Neither the courts nor
the commentators have given these terms anything resem-
bling a rigorous definition, but two main concerns emerge
from the case law. One involves evidence, which unduly ap-
peals to the emotions of the jury, such as gruesome photo-
graphs. The other involves the subject of multiple admissi-
bility, which directly implicates the concept of limited
admissibility. 29
B. Circumstantial Evidence
Rule 401's contemplation of circumstantial evidence and
the principle of multiple admissibility recognizes the reality
of trial practice. The overwhelming majority of relevant evi-
dence used in any trial is, necessarily, circumstantial evi-
dence. Direct evidence, properly defined, is exceedingly
rare."° Even where it does exist as to some issues, the re-
maining issues in the case will have to be proven
circumstantially.
For instance, if an eyewitness watches A shoot B, and A
is charged with murdering B, the eyewitness' testimony
would be direct evidence of an act causing death. Yet the
29. See, e.g., Judicial Discretion, supra note 27, at 65-66.
30. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5214, at 266.
Careful consideration of the ultimate facts in a case and the nature of
testimony will reveal that there is very little evidence in the average
case that can be said to be testimonial direct evidence. Much of the
testimony of an eyewitness to a crime will not prove ultimate facts but
rather facts from which the ultimate facts can be inferred.
Id. at 266-67.
The increasing use of expert testimony, particularly in civil cases, is partially
explainable in these terms. The wide latitude accorded the use of experts by the
Federal Rules of Evidence has created the opportunity to "manufacture" direct
evidence for trial. The temptation exists because of the low threshold of admissibil-
ity for expert testimony generally and because experts may give an opinion even on
ultimate issues. FED. R. EvID. 704(a). Like the "miracle of modern plastics," the
lawyers have used the new rules to synthesize that which is in short supply in
nature: direct testimonial evidence on ultimate issues.
19891
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same testimony is only circumstantial evidence of A's intent
in shooting B.31 For example, if A killed B with only one
shot, a variety of inferences may be drawn from the fact of
the single shot.
First, the single shot is consistent with an intent to kill,
particularly if the bullet penetrated the victim's vital organs.
A single shot through the heart supports a prosecutor's ar-
gument that the defendant had formed the mental purpose
to take a human life. A single shot, it can be argued, means
that the defendant took careful aim at a vital organ with a
loaded weapon, squeezed the trigger, saw the bullet strike
the victim, and knew that more bullets were not necessary.
Yet a single shot is also consistent with a defense theory
of accident, such as, "The gun just went off." The defendant
may offer his own testimony to the effect that he pulled the
hammer of the gun back only to scare the victim, but the
gun "went off" during a struggle with the victim. Depending
on other facts, the defense might try to turn the prosecutor's
argument on its head. If the defendant truly intended to kill
the victim, why were more shots not fired?
In addition to the murder and accident scenarios, the sin-
gle shot is also consistent with self-defense. Under this the-
ory the defendant might argue, "I only shot to protect my-
self from the victim's assault." One shot is consistent with
31. According to McCormick:
Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in is-
sue. Circumstantial evidence may also be testimonial, but even if the
circumstances depicted are accepted as true, additional reasoning is
required to reach the proposition to which it is directed. For example,
a witness' testimony that he saw A stab B with a knife is direct evi-
dence of whether A did indeed stab B. In contrast, testimony that A
fled the scene of the stabbing would be circumstantial evidence of the
stabbing (but direct evidence of the flight itself). Similarly, testimony
of a witness that saw A at the scene would be direct evidence of the
facts asserted, but testimony that he saw someone who was disguised
and masked, but had a voice and limp like A's, would be circumstan-
tial evidence that the person seen was A.
C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 543 (3d ed. 1984) (cita-
tions omitted).
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the defense that the actor used only such force as was rea-
sonably necessary to terminate the assault.
The point is that this single item of evidence gives rise to
multiple inferences all of which are relevant and permissible
under the law. The prosecutor is free to argue the inference
favoring murder from the fact of the single shot, and the
defense is free to argue the inferences that favor its position.
Ultimately the jury will decide which of the competing in-
ferences is more consistent with the other evidence in the
case. Moreover, it may be the case that the jury draws an
inference from the evidence that neither party argued for or
even anticipated.
C. Admissible Evidence
Problems of admissibility arise, however, where the law
has forbidden some of the inferences which arise from an
item of evidence. For example, if evidence gives rise to five
different inferences, three of which are forbidden by the
law, the issue is whether the item should be received into
evidence as it bears on the two remaining propositions. Con-
ventional wisdom holds that so long as the evidence is ad-
missible for even a single proper purpose, it may be
admitted.32
This policy is explicitly set forth in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 105: "When evidence which is admissible as to one
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another
party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly. ' '3 3 The following example is
intended to illustrate how this rule works and the concerns it
raises.
32. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5062, at 303.
33. FED. R. EvID. 105.
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A driver employed by the Speedy Pizza Company has a
horrendous driving record, replete with prior accidents and
near-misses. This same driver allegedly drives his car
through a yellow light and strikes the plaintiff's car. The
plaintiff brings an action against the driver and the com-
pany for ordinary negligence, and against the company
alone for negligent entrustment. It is axiomatic that the
prior driving record is inadmissible to show the driver's
"propensity" for bad driving. 4
The driving record is admissible, however, to support
other propositions. Specifically, it may be used against the
company to prove the claim of negligent entrustment. 35 This
use of the evidence is confined to the rather subtle point of
whether the company had notice that the defendant driver
was a "lousy" driver.3" The company may be entitled to a
limiting instruction, which, in theory, educates the jury
about what it can and cannot do with this evidence, upon a
timely objection or a request for a limiting instruction. 7
34. FED. R. EvID. 404(a) precludes in civil cases the circumstantial use of the
subject's character to prove conduct in conformity therewith. See C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 28, § 189, at 554 ("[T]he rule against using character evidence solely
to prove conduct on a particular occasion has long been applied in civil cases.").
Another commentator has observed:
The civil cases dealing with character evidence reflect an inconsistent
pattern. The dominant view, embodied in the Federal Rules, is that
character evidence offered to support the circumstantial use of charac-
ter in civil cases is generally not worth its cost in time, distraction,
prejudice, . . . and is, accordingly, completely rejected. A minority
view admits certain character evidence in limited cases, such as those
involving fraudulent misconduct or assault and battery.
G. LILLY, supra note 1, at 129 (notes omitted).
35. For a discussion of the law governing the tort of negligent entrustment, see
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS §
33, at 197 (5th ed. 1984).
36. "Character at issue" means that the existence of the character trait must be
determined by the jury; it is an element of the claim. In theory, it is not used for
any further inferences, such as from character to conduct. See G. LILLY, supra
note 1, at 125. Rarely is character at "issue" in civil or criminal litigation. 22 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5235, at 368.
37. See FED. R. EvID. 103(a), 105; 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6,
at § 5065.
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The instruction would inform the jury that it may use the
prior driving record to determine whether the company neg-
ligently hired or kept the driver in its employ. The evidence,
however, may not be used to determine whether the driver
negligently caused the particular accident.3 8
It is a legal axiom that the jury, once instructed, will use
the evidence for only its proper purpose. 9 Whether this is
an accurate description of what occurs or only dogma is the
crux of the problem.
Although the rules appear to prescribe a rather orderly
and logical structure for the presentation of evidence, trial
practice is not nearly as neat as this discussion suggests. In
order to assess the true extent of any problems concerning
multiple admissibility, it is necessary to examine how evi-
dentiary rules are actually used at trial.
III. The Operation of Evidentiary Rules at Trial
Trials are not final examinations in evidence. One of the
great difficulties in teaching trial practice and evidence is
disabusing people of the idea that the rules of evidence are
themselves a road map for trial.4" Moreover, a misconcep-
38. The example discussed in the text is based on the discussion in J.
FRIEDENTHAL & M. SINGER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 20 (1985).
39. In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1709, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 176, 188 (1987), a case involving the admissibility of post-arrest statements
by accomplices in the joint trial of criminal defendants, the Supreme Court dis-
cussed the rationale for limiting instructions generally. The Court observed that
"[t]he rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one,
rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief
that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the
state and the defendant in the criminal justice process."
40. Sometimes, of course, an attorney may deliberately choose not to object be-
cause of tactical considerations. The jury is not apt to look kindly on a party seek-
ing to win by keeping out evidence. McCormick offers the following advice:
One who comes to the trial of cases fresh from the course in Evidence
in law school tends to assume that whenever the adversary offers proof
that is inadmissible, the right thing to do is to object. Experience will
soon convince a sensible learner that this attitude of automatic ob-
jecting is wrong. One must remember that the rules of exclusion are
numerous and far-reaching so that any case offers an infinity of oppor-
1989]
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tion about evidence courses is that they will teach someone
how to prove something."' Upon more mature, or jaded, re-
flection, one realizes that evidence rules are not guides to
proof or persuasion, but rather "operators" which affect the
quantity, quality and, above all, the form of the evidence
which goes before the jury.
The extent to which the rules of evidence are operative in
any trial will depend upon two factors. First, it will depend
upon the working knowledge of evidence law possessed by
the parties' lawyers. Law professors delight in the meta-
physical subtleties of evidence law. "Hillmon problems,"" 2
tunities for plausible objecting. One learns also that the jury does not
look upon a trial as a lawyer's game in which objecting is one of the
moves. They want to know the facts and they look upon objections as
attempts to hide the facts and upon successful objections as the actual
suppression of facts. If this description of the jury's attitude is sound,
then certain consequences as to desirable tactics seem to follow.
In the first place, no objections should be made unless [counsel has]
reason to believe that the making of the objection will do [his] case
more good than harm. If the objection has little chance of being sus-
tained, at the trial or on appeal, it should usually be waived ...
[O]bjections to leading questions or to opinion evidence frequently re-
sult in strengthening the examiner's case by requiring him to elicit his
testimony in more concrete and convincing form. In general, . . . ob-
jections should be few and should be directed only to evidence which if
admitted will be substantially harmful, and as to which [counsel be-
lieves he] can get a favorable ruling at the trial or on appeal. Finally,
. . . the cardinal aim is that the jury be made to see that the objection
is based not on a mere technical rule, but on reason and fairness.
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 9, 103[02], at 103-13 (1986) (quoting C.
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 52, at 121-22 (1st ed. 1954)). See
also J. MCELHANEY, MCELHANEY'S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 220 (2d ed. 1987) ("Never
make an objection without a good reason for it. A trial is not an evidence
examination.").
41. It appears that the modern trend in teaching evidence law is moving closer
to an approach that goes beyond "rules and cases" and analyzes how the rules
function at trial, i.e., within the dynamic of proof. See Lubet, What We Should
Teach (But Don't) When We Teach Trial Advocacy, 37 J. LEGAL EDuC. 123, 142
(1987).
42. A "Hillmon problem" involves the admissibility of an out-of-court state-
ment evincing the declarant's then-existing state of mind to prove that the declar-
ant later behaved in conformity with that state of mind expressed earlier in that
statement. See, for example, the discussion of Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S. Ct. 909, 36 L. Ed. 706 (1892), in G. LILLY, supra
note 1, at 149-55. The "Hillmon doctrine" raises interesting difficulties involving
hearsay and relevancy, especially when the declarant's expressed intent was to do
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implied assertions,4 3 and conditional relevancy4 4 are fasci-
nating problems intellectually. Many of these concerns,
however, are either inconsequential at trial or too reified to
"catch" during the ebb and flow of testimony.45 Objections
must be lodged generally in the few seconds that separate
question from answer. A failure to anticipate the otherwise
inadmissible evidence before trial or immediately recognize
it during trial means that the evidence is "admitted" for any
relevant purpose.4 6
something with a third party and the statement is offered to prove the declarant
did the act with the third party. See, e.g., R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, supra note 7, at
430-36.
43. Implied assertions involve the scope of the hearsay definition. Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as an oral or written "statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." A "statement" is defined as "(1)
an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended
by the person as an assertion." FED. R. EvID. 801(a). Difficulties arise when the
out-of-court statement is offered to prove something other than the literal truth of
the matter asserted in the statement; that is, to prove the truth of an implied
assertion. Some courts have held that implied assertions do not involve "hearsay"
as defined in the rules. See, e.g., United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.
Ky. 1980); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801(a)[02]
(1984). Others insist that implied assertions are hearsay under the rule. See, e.g.,
M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.7, at 714 (2d ed. 1986); R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 369 (2d ed.
1983).
44. Problems of conditional relevancy involve the respective roles of judge and
jury as triers of fact. The difficulty is in identifying which "preliminary questions
of fact" are to be decided by the judge. See G. LILLY, supra note 1, at 40.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 49-51.
46. These observations are predicated upon this author's own experience as a
trial lawyer. Unfortunately, no empirical studies exist comparing the frequency
with which evidentiary issues arise at trial to the frequency with which they are
later brought up on appeal. Similarly, this author has found no empirical studies
examining how, when, or why trial lawyers exercise their power to object at trial.
Some evidentiary issues are so obvious and so critical that competent trial coun-
sel will immediately recognize the problem and object. The best examples, and
maybe the only ones, are the admission of other act evidence against a criminal
defendant and proof of similar accidents in civil cases. This observation is
grounded upon the thousands of appellate cases which concern just these issues
and the experience that :awyers usually do not miss an opportunity to object to
this obviously troublesome evidence. See Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All:
No Right to Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution's Uncharged Misconduct Evi-
dence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 255 (1987). As a general rule, trial lawyers tend
to object as little as possible and only when absolutely necessary. See A. TANFORD,
THE TRIAL PROCESS 304 (1983); see also supra text accompanying note 39.
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Second, the operation of evidentiary rules at trial depends
upon the willingness of the lawyers to object. Many things
occur during trial which are objectionable. An experienced
trial lawyer will only object if there is a tactical advantage
to objecting as well as a legal basis for the objection.47 This
important principle of trial practice is not explicitly set forth
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, but is implicit in its struc-
ture. Federal Rule of Evidence 103 requires that parties ob-
ject to evidence that they want kept out of evidence. The
objection must be timely and specific. A failure to object, or
an inadequate objection, means that the issue cannot be
raised on appeal.4"
Rule 103 does not require that attorneys object any time
there is a legal basis for doing so. An objection serves two
purposes. First, it alerts the trial court that the objecting
party wants action taken. In this sense it serves as the mech-
anism necessary to "involve" the judge in the presentation
of the evidence, which is otherwise controlled by the par-
47. One author states:
Just because an objection can be made does not mean that you neces-
sarily should make it. Each time that you object, you should have a
reason for doing so. This decision requires you to weigh the benefits
against the risk that you will [harm] your own case. It will depend on
the nature of the evidence offered, the grounds you can assert, the con-
text of the particular controversy, and whether there is an alternative
way of dealing with the evidence.
A. TANFORD, supra note 46, at 302.
48. M. GRAHAM, supra note 43, § 103.1. Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(l)
provides:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of
the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the
context. . ..
The only exceptions to Rule 103's requirement of an objection are the plain error
doctrine and when the defense counsel's failure to object in a criminal case consti-
tutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
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ties.49 Second, if the objection is overruled, a timely and
specific objection preserves the record for review by appel-
late courts. If the lawyer is not interested in either of these
considerations, there is no duty to object.
Unfortunately, a lawyer is under no obligation to object,
and the courts are under no special obligation to police the
trial proceedings to ensure fidelity to the rules of evidence.50
Whether a lawyer deliberately allows objectionable testi-
mony to come in or never sees the problem at all, the result
is the same: the evidence is in the record and a jury may use
it to reach a decision. Courts sometimes rationalize this pro-
cess as a "waiver" of the objection under the rules, but it is
more precisely conceptualized as involving the power of at-
torneys to invoke the rules as they see fit.51
Federal Rule of Evidence 105 sets forth analogous proce-
dures for dealing with the difficulties created by the concept
of multiple admissibility. The rule permits the opponent to
request that evidence be received for only a limited purpose.
By requesting a limiting ruling or instruction, the objecting
party forces the proponent of the evidence to disclose what
the evidence is being used to prove.
49. For a discussion of the party presentation principle, see F. JAMES & G. HAZ-
ARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 318 (3d ed. 1985).
50. R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS 327-30 (1988).
51. Wright and Graham observed:
Read properly, Rule 103 rejects a bit of faulty analysis that can be
traced to Wigmore. "A Rule of Evidence not invoked is waived," wrote
the famous scholar, and courts have been repeating this fallacy ever
since. At one level, this can be dismissed as simply a matter of careless
usage. Courts that talk in terms of "waiver" have never examined the
conduct of a party to see if it comports with the standard definitions of
that concept before barring him from raising a point on appeal that
was not the subject of an objection below. According to an oft-quoted
definition, a "waiver is ... an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right of privilege." Yet the failure to object below
precludes raising the point on appeal without any showing that the
party or his attorney was aware of the grounds of objection. Indeed, a
party is barred on appeal even where the attorney was enthusiastically
asserting his client's rights, but simply garbled the objection.
21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5033, at 162 (notes omitted).
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If the evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, the
judge must, upon request, instruct the jury about the re-
stricted use of the evidence.52 Often the request for the rul-
ing is coupled with an objection to exclude the use of the
evidence for any purpose. The objection may be based upon
the danger that the jury will draw the forbidden inference
regardless of a limiting instruction. 53 The request for a lim-
iting instruction, like an objection, must be timely and
specific.54
Recognizing potential objections is a function of the law-
yer's erudition in evidence law and alertness at trial. The
multiple admissibility of evidence, however, creates special
problems. When testimony is given at trial, the proponent
simply asks questions and the witness responds. The propo-
nent is not obligated to justify the admissibility of each an-
swer or explain what it is being offered to prove. The testi-
monial process is not akin to some form of deductive proof
52. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 9, 1 105[01], at 105-5 (1986) ("It is
important to note that once the court decides to admit any evidence which can be
used for limited purposes, it may not refuse a requested instruction.").
53. As many have observed, the tendency has been to admit the evidence re-
gardless of this danger. McCormick points out that:
In this frequently arising situation, subject to the limitations outlined
below, the normal practice in case law and under the Federal and Re-
vised Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) is to admit the evidence. The
interest of the adversary is to be protected, not by an objection to its
admission, but by a request at the time of the offer for an instruction
that the jury is to consider the evidence only for the allowable purpose.
Such an instruction may not always be effective, but admission of the
evidence with the limiting instruction is normally the best available
reconciliation of the respective interests. It seems, however, that in sit-
uations where the danger of the jury's misuse of the evidence for the
incompetent purpose is great, and its value for the legitimate purpose
is slight or the point for which it is competent can readily be proved by
other evidence, the judge's power to exclude the evidence altogether is
clear in case law and under the Federal and Revised Uniform Rules of
Evidence.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, § 59, at 151-52; see also 21 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5065, at 325.
54. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5065.
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where each step in the argument must be justified by refer-
ence to a rule.
As discussed in Section II, evidence often gives rise to
multiple inferences. Trial procedures do not demand that
the proponent list all possible inferences that could be drawn
from the evidence and then alert the court as to the ones
being used. Unless opposing counsel objects or invokes Rule
105, the evidence is generally received for all relevant
propositions.55
The danger is that opposing counsel may think the testi-
mony is coming in for one purpose, make no objection or
limiting request, and later find that the proponent is using
the evidence for an entirely different purpose to which he
should have objected.5" The rules' response to this scenario
is necessarily harsh; the failure to object or request a limit-
ing instruction at the time the evidence was introduced
'"waives" any problems that the attorney could have
anticipated.57
Conversely, it appears that the proponent of the evidence
is under no special obligation to warn the opponent or the
court that the evidence may give rise to multiple inferences,
some of which may be "forbidden" or perhaps objectionable
55. In many cases, the function of a request for a limiting instruction is to de-
termine the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. In the usual case, it is
the opposing party that wants the evidence restricted to a limited use, if admitted
at all. The proponent of the evidence typically welcomes the general admission of
the evidence for any purpose. In short, the opposing party uses a Rule 105 request
as a device to learn what the proponent is trying to prove with the evidence. See 21
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5065, at 323.
56. See, e.g., State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App.
1982). In Hoffman the defendant offered testimony about a telephone bill and
later moved it into evidence without any qualifications or limitations. In closing
argument, the prosecutor used the bill to attack the credibility of another defense
witness. The court rejected the defendant's claim that the prosecutor could not use
the evidence in this manner. Because the defendant had failed to request any re-
strictions on the use of the bill, it could be used for any relevant purpose.
57. See supra text accompanying note 49. Another justification for this rule is
to enforce the requirement that objections be timely and specific. It is difficult to
discern whether the objecting lawyer let the objection pass in "good faith" or just
missed it. The law of evidence does not distinguish between these reasons for fail-
ing to object. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 311.
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under Rule 403. This invites the difficult question regarding
the extent to which the proponent of the evidence is bound
to police his own proof for fidelity to the rules of evidence.
The unhappy answer is that this question is largely, if not
entirely, rhetorical.5 8 Given the nature of modern evidence
rules, there is much truth to the old saying that there are
three ways to get anything into evidence. The Federal Rules
of Evidence are broad, inscrutably ambiguous at points, and
invest such wide discretion in the trial judge that colorable
arguments can be made to support the admissibility of virtu-
ally any item of evidence. Moreover, the law of evidence has
wisely resisted the temptation to try to assess the "true mo-
tives" of the lawyer offering the evidence. 9 In short, the
rules provide a verdant field from which skillful lawyers
reap tenable arguments supporting the admissibility of most
evidence.
If the evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, the trial
judge is obligated to give the jury a limiting instruction
upon a party's request. This raises two immediate questions.
First, can the jury follow such an instruction? Second, will
they follow it? The assumption is that the jury will follow
the instruction.6" The assumption is not, however, buttressed
by reality. Nevertheless, the law of evidence has a built-in
mechanism by which it insulates itself from the implications
of this contradiction.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606 serves to shield the trial
system from its own institutional contradictions. The rule
precludes any inquiry into the quality of the jury delibera-
tions. Verdicts cannot be assailed based on retrospective in-
quiries into what the jury thought about the evidence or the
58. See R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, supra note 50.
59. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 311.
60. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1706, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 176, 185 (1987).
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law."' It assures that no post-trial "final examination" tests
the jury's comprehension of the judge's instructions, sub-
stantive or procedural.62 One simply posits in Panglossian
fashion that they do understand them.63
61. A revised rule based on prior case law, however, presents a different
approach:
Federal and Revised Uniform Rule of Evidence (1974) 606(b) take a
more conservative tack based upon prior federal case law. First, these
rules do not equate with, or govern, grounds for a new trial, but merely
govern the competency of jurors to testify concerning the jury process.
Second, in addition to jurors' thought processes, discussions, motives,
beliefs and mistakes, they exclude irregular juror conduct in the jury
room. Third, they do not exclude juror testimony of extraneous preju-
dicial influences. Fourth, they do not preclude testimony of others
about their knowledge of jury misconduct.
C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 68, at 166-67 (3d ed. 1984). An-
other author noted:
The independence of the trier of fact from government control legiti-
mates the outcomes of trials in a democratic state. Independence
means that the trier's conclusions about reliability are nonaccountable,
and that its general knowledge can be nonprecedential. The lay jury is
the paradigm independent factfinder, but the values of independence
attach to the trial judge in her role as factfinder as well.
The jury's decisions are nonaccountable, meaning that in its verdict,
the jury does not give an account of what sources of knowledge it re-
lied on, or how it evaluated their credibility. The jury does not disclose
which foundation facts it used, does not explain the coherence and va-
lidity of the general knowledge it applied, and does not have to justify
its conclusions as against other possible choices.
Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1339, 1367
(1987).
62. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 97 L. Ed. 2d
90 (1987) (no error when the trial court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing
concerning the alleged use of alcohol and drugs by the jury during the trial).
63. For instance, all twelve jurors could submit affidavits averring that they dis-
regarded the judge's limiting instruction on evidence either because they did not
understand it or did not like it. But the response of the legal system in either
instance is the same: the assumption is that they did follow the instructions regard-
less of what the jurors later say. This device, then, permits the use of limited
admissibility with virtual impunity from the suspicion or the reality that the jury
cannot follow limiting instructions.
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IV. Criticisms of Limited Admissibility
A. Limiting Instructions
The general subject of limited admissibility has received
little attention from courts or commentators. Most of the
criticism has been directed at specific applications of the
rule in a given context. One common thread that runs
throughout this criticism, regardless of the evidentiary prob-
lem under discussion, is that limiting instructions are inef-
fective or useless in most instances and potentially damag-
ing in others. 4 Courts and commentators have long
understood that limiting instructions are difficult or impossi-
ble for juries to comprehend and obey. Wigmore stated:
The practice of admitting evidence for a limited purpose
is, of course, already an exercise in faith-faith that the
jury will use the evidence for its proper purpose or in
the proper fashion. It is a disservice to ignore the real
dangers that arise when evidence is submitted to the
jury for limited purposes."5
Justice Jackson also criticized the efficacy of limiting in-
structions within the context of conspiracy prosecutions:
"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be over-
come by instructions to the jury, . . . all practicing lawyers
know to be unmitigated fiction."'16 These observations are
buttressed by various psychological research which confirms
that jurors cannot follow these instructions.
Social scientists and psychologists have conducted studies
on jury behavior. Most salient to this discussion are those
experiments that analyze a jury's ability to disregard inad-
missible evidence and those that explore their ability to
64. See supra note 7.
65. 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, at 696.
66. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 S. Ct. 716, 723, 93 L.
Ed. 790, 799 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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comprehend limiting instructions. Although the studies are
somewhat revealing, the findings must be treated cautiously.
First, they are not extensive in terms of the issues of lim-
ited admissibility that have been scrutinized. For example,
the admissibility of a criminal defendant's prior conviction
for impeachment purposes has received the most attention. 7
No one, however, has examined the broader problem
presented by the admission of other act evidence or the im-
pact of the introduction of similar accidents in civil cases.
The second and more serious shortcoming is that some of
this research is so contrived that there is little support for it
as any kind of an accurate barometer for actual trial prac-
tice.6" It is difficult to see how one can meaningfully com-
pare a two-week murder trial with a scenario in which the
mock jury is given ten minutes to read a four page fact pat-
tern that represents the "trial." 9
At any rate, the findings of these studies confirm the non-
empirically based intuition of lawyers and courts. They re-
veal that it is difficult for jurors to disregard inadmissible
evidence once they have been exposed to it.7° Regardless of
67. See, for example, the studies discussed in Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy
of Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 37, 43 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating The Prejudi-
cial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify The Impact of Improper Evidence on
Jurors?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147 (1983). This study has been roundly and justifia-
bly criticized:
A simplistic and badly-flawed empirical study purports to show that
judges are incapable of assessing prejudicial effect. The study used a
small and unrepresentative group of judges, lawyers, and laypersons to
rank differing bits of evidence in terms of its impact on a hypothetical
trial. The study supposedly shows that there is very little agreement
among persons within the groups as to what is prejudicial and that
laypersons and lawyers tended to evaluate the evidence in quite differ-
ent ways. The latter finding is hardly surprising since the two groups
were asked different questions.
22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5215, at 233 (Supp. 1989).
69. Carretta & Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evi-
dence, 7 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCH. 291, 294 (1983).
70. R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 87 (1983)
[hereinafter INSIDE THE JURY] (discussing the "subtle and possibly unconscious
impact of inadmissible testimony" on jurors); S. KASSINS & L. WRIGHTSMAN, THE
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the instructions that are given to them, the inadmissible in-
formation appears to have an effect on the jury's decision.
The studies also indicate that jurors, like everyone else,
have difficulty comprehending jury instructions. This is es-
pecially true of the garden variety patterned instructions
that are widely used on both procedural and substantive is-
sues at trial.
From these two observations concerning the difficulty ju-
rors have disregarding inadmissible evidence and their
problems in following jury instructions, one can draw a
third conclusion. When the jury is told that a certain item
of evidence may be used for one purpose but not for others,
they have an especially difficult time.
A recent study illustrates this third observation.7' Re-
searchers sought to gauge the effects of limiting instructions
under Federal Rule of Evidence 609 which inform the jury
that it may consider a defendant's prior criminal convictions
to assess his credibility, but may not use it as evidence of
criminal propensity. The study concluded that the sample
juries did not use the prior convictions to assess credibility
because the jurors had such a low opinion of a defendant's
credibility from the start.7" Furthermore, the researchers
observed that the percentage of convictions varied as a func-
tion of the existence and type of prior criminal record.73
With respect to the efficacy of limiting instructions, the
study observed:
On the basis of the available data, we conclude that the
presentation of the defendant's criminal record does not
affect the defendant's credibility, but does increase the
AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 211 (1988) (instructions admonishing juries not to
make unwarranted inferences "are not particularly effective," since jurors will use
any information that helps them make the "right" decision); Carretta & More-
land, supra note 63; Cope, Can Jurors Ignore Inadmissible Evidence?, TRIAL,
Sept. 1988, at 80; Wissler & Saks, supra note 67.
71. Wissler & Saks, supra note 67.
72. Id. at 41.
73. Id. at 42.
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likelihood of conviction, and that the judge's limiting in-
structions do not appear to correct the error. People's
decision processes do not employ the prior-conviction
evidence in the way the law wishes them to use it. 4
Despite any methodological shortcomings, the extant psy-
chological studies provide empirical support for the intui-
tively obvious conclusion that limiting instructions as pres-
ently conceived do not, and cannot, effectively control the
minds and thought processes of jurors. The difficulty is ex-
acerbated when the distinctions between the permissible and
impermissible uses of the evidence are exceedingly subtle or
perhaps nonexistent.
B. Integration Into the Federal Rules of Evidence
Despite the abundant well placed criticisms by legal com-
mentators and psychologists, this same scenario of limited
admissibility recurs over and over in the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the state codes modeled upon it. Not only is
limited admissibility inherent in the general relevance provi-
sions of Rules 401 through 403, but it is encompassed in
other significant provisions of the rules.75 Three disparate
examples will serve to illustrate the point. These illustrations
were selected to highlight the degree to which limited ad-
missibility has become integrated into the Federal Rules of
74. Id. at 47.
75. The concept of limited admissibility has found its way into many provisions
of the rules.
Many rules of evidence turn on the purpose for which the evidence is
offered: an out-of-court declaration is hearsay only if used to prove the
truth of the matter asserted; evidence of subsequent repairs cannot be
used to show negligence; evidence of the defendant's character is inad-
missible for the purpose of showing that he probably committed the
crime. In each of these cases, however, the evidence is admissible if it
is offered for some other purpose: an alleged hearsay statement to
prove notice, subsequent repairs to show ownership of the repaired
property, or character evidence to impeach the defendant as a witness.
21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5062, at 302 (notes omitted).
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Evidence. The purpose is not to exhaustively analyze the
particular evidentiary issues, but to illustrate the workings
of limited admissibility within each instance.
The first example is the admissibility of "other acts,
wrongs, or crimes." The second is the definition of hearsay
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801. The third will examine
the workings of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which autho-
rizes the admission of expert opinion testimony even when it
is based on "inadmissible" evidence. This last example may
underscore the problem more dramatically than any other.
All three illustrations involve problems of proof that arise in
virtually all trials, civil and criminal. All three involve rules
of admissibility that hinge on the concept of limited admis-
sibility. All three have been roundly criticized.
1. Prior Bad Acts Evidence
Many criminal defendants have records of prior convic-
tions or have been involved in some sort of wrongdoing of
which the prosecutor is aware. The general rule is that this
evidence cannot be used at trial to show that the defendant
has a criminal character and, therefore, a propensity for
criminal behavior. 76 That is, the law precludes any inference
running from the defendant's character to his conduct in
conformity with his character on a particular occasion.77
76. The example discussed in the text is taken from criminal law, but the ad-
missibility of other similar accidents in civil cases raises nearly identical concerns.
See Reed, The Pushy Ox: Character Evidence In Pennsylvania Civil Actions, 58
TEMP. L.Q. 623 (1985).
77. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5239,
at 435 ("The other crimes rule is simply a special application of the doctrine of
multiple admissibility; that is, evidence that is inadmissible for one purpose is not
to be excluded if it is admissible for some other purpose unless the judge, in his
discretion, determines that the danger of its prejudicial use for the improper pur-
pose outweighs its legitimate probative value.").
Problems in the administration of Rule 404 are discussed thoroughly in Im-
winkelried, The Need To Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat To
The Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465 (1985).
[Vol. 13:781
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Nevertheless, the prosecution frequently offers evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts against a criminal defendant.
The evidence is admitted not to show criminal propensity,
but ostensibly to prove other things, such as motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, knowledge, or identity. Upon request, the jury
is instructed that the evidence of the other act, which is typ-
ically criminal in nature, may only be used for the pre-
scribed permissible purposes, not for the forbidden inference
of propensity.
This rule has been widely criticized for the seeming ease
with which prosecutors evade the general proscription bar-
ring bad character evidence.18 The lament is often that the
proffered permissible use, e.g., intent, is merely a pretext for
admitting the evidence in the hope that the jury will draw
the forbidden inference regardless of any limiting instruc-
tions or admonishments.
78. See the comments of Professors Wright and Graham:
It is important to distinguish between a true problem of multiple ad-
missibility and the administration of legal fictions. Some of the sup-
posed rules of exclusion are not, and were not intended to be, anything
other than pious ceremonials to long dead gods. An example is the rule
that asserts that the prosecution cannot use evidence of the criminal
defendant's bad acts to show he is the sort of person that is likely to
have committed the crime. The Rule is so riddled with exceptions that
only an incompetent prosecutor could fail to get the defendant's past
derelictions into evidence. Indeed, many courts will admit such evi-
dence even if the defendant offers to stipulate to the fact that the evi-
dence is supposedly offered to prove. Why, then, did the Advisory
Committee not abolish the rule? Answer: because it offers the judge a
splendid opportunity to demonstrate to the jurors how fair the system
is by reciting to them a supposed maxim of fairness that they are ex-
pected to honor in the breach. Were the judge to exclude the evidence,
by application of the supposed rule, he would deprive the jury of the
right to witness this patriotic ritual. Since the rule exists only to sup-
port the giving of the instruction, there is little need for extensive anal-
ysis of whether the evidence ought to be admitted or of alternative
means of protecting the defendant.
21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 308.
See also Leonard, The Use of Character To Prove Conduct: Rationality And
Catharsis In The Law Of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1987); Uvillier, Evi-
dence Of Character To Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic and Injustice In The
Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845 (1982).
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Putting to one side the question of prosecutorial bad faith,
the real crux of the problem, from the standpoint of limited
admissibility, is distinguishing the concept of character from
the other permissible purposes. The prevailing "inclusionary
approach" to other act evidence establishes that the evi-
dence is admissible where its probative value does not de-
pend upon an inference of conduct in conformity with a
character trait.79
As an abstraction, the rule is beguilingly simple and
straightforward. The law's failure to define the concept of
"character" with precision means that this formulation of
the rule is, more often than not, a rationalization for a con-
clusion rather than an analytic structure. Neither the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence nor the common law have satisfacto-
rily defined "character."8 The case law and commentators
appear content to define character as a "generalized disposi-
tion" and list certain accepted character traits, such as law
abidedness and peacefulness.8" This amorphous approach
virtually assures failure. If character has no settled mean-
ing, how does one identify the permissible use of other act
evidence for proving "non-character" inferences?
The concept of limited admissibility, however, requires
that this distinction be drawn. The question becomes: is
there an articulable difference between the concept of char-
acter and the so-called permissible uses of this evidence
which can be explained to the jury in a meaningful way?
79. See Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand The Character of Specific
Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 780 (1981).
80. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 19, § 5233 (surveys the con-
fusion over the definition of character).
81. Kuhns, supra note 79, at 794. The prevailing approach also attempts to
flesh out "character" by contrasting it with "habit," which is also an elusive term.
The classic statement of this approach is found in C. MCCORMICK, supra note 31,
at § 195.
One failed effort at codifying the law of evidence defined character as follows:
"Rule 304. Definition of Character. Character as used in these Rules means the
aggregate of a person's traits, including those relating to care and skill and their
opposites." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 182.
[Vol. 13:781
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This distinction is vital if the court must frame a limiting
instruction that will educate the jury about what it can or
cannot do with the evidence.
In short, it may be that the difficulties caused by the use
of other act evidence is in part explained by the law's am-
bivalence over the notion of "character." Indeed, the con-
ceptual confusion may mask, or foster, other reasons for
permitting the introduction of this evidence which the courts
cannot or will not articulate.82
2. The Definition of Hearsay
The doctrine of multiple admissibility is also given play in
the definition of hearsay. An out-of-court statement may be
offered by the proponent to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement. If it is, the statement is hearsay as
defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c), which provides:
"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the de-
clarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."83 When
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay
must comport with one of the nearly forty exceptions to the
rule of exclusion.84
82. One study has been interpreted as concluding that limited admissibility may
"reflect an ambivalence" concerning the desired impact of evidentiary rules which
would otherwise operate to wholly exclude or admit the evidence. See S. KASSINS
& L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 70, at 153 (construing the results of a study by
Wallace Loh). In such instances, there is a desire to give this information to the
jury, but a reluctance, not an inability, to explain exactly why the evidence is
being admitted. "As a compromise between decision-making accuracy and the val-
ues of procedural fairness, the rules of evidence thus strike a balance between
wholesale acceptance and rejection of [evidence of prior criminal convictions as
impeachment evidence]."
83. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
84. This assumes that the opponent has made a timely objection on the ground
of hearsay. If there is no such objection, then it is not necessary to lay such a
foundation. See supra text accompanying notes 40-49. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence recognize thirty-seven "exceptions," if one counts the Rule 801(d) "exemp-
tions" as exceptions. See also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399 n.12, 106
S. Ct. 1121, 1128 n.12, 89 L. Ed. 2d 390, 401 n.12 (1986).
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The proponent may, however, offer the statement for
something other than the truth of what it asserts. The most
common non-hearsay purposes are to establish the effect of
the statement on a listener, to show the declarant's knowl-
edge, or to prove a verbal act, or verbal part of an act.8"
Regardless of what the out-of-court statement is offered to
prove, the jury hears, or sees, the statement. The only differ-
ence is the use to which the evidence may be put.
If the statement is offered for a non-hearsay purpose, the
judge, upon request, instructs the jury about the limited use
that the evidence may be given at trial. The limiting instruc-
tion looks efficient and expedient in the abstract, but when
one considers what is actually being asked of the jury, the
difficulties emerge quickly.
It is simple to put this matter in perspective. All lawyers,
judges, and law students have struggled, or will struggle, at
some point with the distinction between offering a statement
for some non-hearsay purpose as opposed to offering it for
the truth of the matter asserted. Without the benefit of a
legal education, the jury is literally told that the out-of-
court statement was received for the non-hearsay purpose
and that the statement is not to be used for the truth of the
matter asserted. Without hornbooks, nutshells, computer as-
sisted legal instruction, or even "testimonial triangles," not
to mention days or weeks to ponder the distinction, a jury
might find that the judge's one or two sentence "explana-
tion" really does little to flesh out the concept.86
The point is that these reified distinctions demand consid-
erable treatment within the formal evidence course of the
law school curriculum. Yet we "educate" the jury about
85. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, § 249; Lilly, supra note 1, § 6.2.
86. The distinctions discussed in the text have received massive attention from
the commentators. Law school evidence texts devote considerable attention to re-
finements of the definition. See, e.g., R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 43,
at 347 (devoting thirty-four pages of text and problems to the definition of hear-
say); R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, supra note 7, at 293 (devoting fifty-six pages to the
concept of hearsay).
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precisely these concepts through a limiting instruction. If
McCormick had difficulty explaining the concept clearly,
one suspects that the distinction probably eludes most juries
as well.87
3. Expert Opinion Predicated Upon Inadmissible
Evidence
A final example of the problems presented by limited ad-
missibility involves Federal Rule of Evidence 703. This rule
allows an expert to base an opinion on facts or data that are
"otherwise inadmissible" provided they are of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field.
If the rule authorized only the admission of the opinion
itself, as opposed to the underlying basis, there would be lit-
tle problem with it. Rule 703, however, permits the underly-
ing basis of the opinion to be disclosed to the trier of fact
even when the evidence constituting at least part of the basis
is "otherwise inadmissible."88 Thus, the rule works to put
before the jury evidence that does not otherwise pass muster
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Upon timely request,
the judge will instruct the jury that the evidence was re-
ceived solely for the purpose of demonstrating the basis for
the expert's opinion and that it should not be used for any
other purpose.
Rule 703 operates most frequently as a kind of hearsay
exception. Through the mechanism of a cooperative expert
witness willing to testify that the facts or data are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, courts have
permitted the use of a plethora of out-of-court statements
87. Park, McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay: A Critical
Analysis Followed by Suggestion to. Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 423 (1981)
(explaining McCormick's confusion of the declarant-oriented and assertion-ori-
ented definitions of hearsay).
88. See Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic
Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1988); M. GRAHAM, supra
note 42, § 703.1.
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that otherwise fail to qualify under any of the hearsay ex-
ceptions. For instance, a medical expert may testify about
the earlier diagnoses and findings of other doctors, which do
not fit within any recognized hearsay exception.89 Similarly,
a fireman has been allowed to testify about the utterance of
an unknown bystander, even when the statements failed to
qualify as a present sense impression or an excited
utterance."0
Assuming that a party has made a timely objection or re-
quest, the judge will instruct the jury that the out-of-court
statements cannot be used for the truth of the matter as-
serted. Critics have pointed out that jurors cannot distin-
guish analytically between the statement's use as a basis for
the expert opinion and its use to prove the truth of what is
asserted in the statement. 9 The accuracy of this observation
is beyond question. Courts that have referred to Rule 703 as
a "hearsay exception" are probably closer to the truth of the
matter than any subtle academic distinction between the
two uses of the evidence.92
These observations have serious repercussions for the law
of evidence as implemented in the trial court. Suppose the
proponent of an expert witness wants the witness to refer to
some otherwise inadmissible item of hearsay while explain-
ing the basis of his opinion. The opponent may consider ob-
jecting, but dismiss the idea as a waste of time. Rule 703, as
interpreted by the courts, requires only that the proponent
establish that the evidence is of a type reasonably relied
upon by other experts in the field in rendering opinions.
89. O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1978) (The court
allowed the plaintiffs medical expert to testify about what other non-testifying
medical experts said about the plaintiffs injury, based on the reports of the non-
testifying medical experts and plaintiffs rendition about what her other doctors
had told her about the injury.).
90. Bagnowski v. Preway, Inc., 138 Wis. 2d 241, 251, 405 N.W.2d 746, 751
(Ct. App. 1987).
91. R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, supra note 6, at 764; Carlson, Policing the Bases of
Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986).
92. See Bagnowski, 405 N.W.2d at 751.
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Usually the objection can be brushed aside by the simple
expedient of asking the witness: "Is this the kind of evidence
that you and other experts rely upon in rendering opin-
ions?"19 3 Moreover, the objection may serve only to force the
opponent into laying a more persuasive foundation for the
evidence. At best the opponent gains whatever advantage
there is in a limiting instruction that tells the jury not to use
this statement for the truth of the matter asserted, but only
as it forms a basis for the expert's opinion. 94
Faced with these prospects, the opponent may well choose
to forego the objection or limiting request and decide in-
stead to discredit the evidence or opinion through impeach-
ment. The failure to object, however, means that the state-
ment has been admitted for all relevant purposes, including
the truth of the matter asserted. 95
In summary, Rule 703 may fail to function effectively, or
at all, at the trial level. The prevailing laissez faire attitude
toward expert testimony is one by which trial lawyers face
this evidence as best they can on cross-examination and at-
tempt to counter it with their own "friendly" expert. The
appellate cases and legal commentary dealing with this issue
may only dimly reflect a much larger problem that exists at
the trial court level, when objecting to evidence is the excep-
tion and not the rule.
93. See Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 480
(1986).
94. See R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, supra note 7.
95. The only clear way of winning a Rule 703 objection is to convince the trial
judge that experts do not reasonably rely upon the inadmissible facts or data in
rendering opinions. Because the testifying expert will normally insist that he or she
does rely on the particular basis and that it is reasonable for the expert to do so,
opposing counsel must persuade the judge through other evidence or testimony
that this is wrong. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.
Supp. 1223, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Despite assertions to the contrary by plain-
tiffs' expert witnesses, the court held that medical experts would not rely upon
"hearsay checklists" representing the medical history of a patient in rendering
medical opinions.); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (approaching the same problem from the perspective of sufficiency of
the evidence, not admissible).
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V. Should the Law of Evidence Constitute an
Exercise in Faith?
The law of evidence should not be trapped between the
delusion that juries follow limiting instructions and the de-
spair that they either cannot or will not follow them. There
is a need to rethink what we are trying to accomplish with
limited admissibility and with evidentiary rules generally.
If limited admissibility is conceived narrowly as a device
used to "control" the jury's thought processes, two roads are
available. One is to continue along the present course, turn
our backs to reality and take whatever comfort we can from
a practice that holds that juries follow such instructions only
because we postulate that they do.
The second alternative is to verify whether juries ade-
quately understand instructions. To accomplish this, it will
be necessary to relax the rules governing the competency of
jurors to testify about their thought processes during delib-
erations. A verdict could then be scrutinized for the jury's
fidelity to the judge's instructions. If it came to light that
jurors misunderstood a limiting instruction, courts could
consider granting a retrial or other relief on this ground.9"
This alternative, however, is totally unworkable. Opening
up the process of jury deliberations to psychological autop-
sies into their quality, particularly with respect to the jury's
comprehension of the instructions, would critically affect the
jury system. Not only might it undermine constitutional
rights, but it is also procedurally impractical. Disgruntled
parties would look for any indication that the jury ignored
or misapprehended the instructions. Post-verdict motions
would turn into sideshows featuring a trial of the trial, this
time starring the original jury as grist for the litigation mill.
96. This suggestion is advanced in Steele & Thornburg, supra note 7, at 468.
The authors of that article, however, recognized that this might create "other
problems" and advocate prevention (i.e., clearer instructions) rather than cure. Id.
at 468, n.170.
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Challenges to a jury's understanding of limiting instructions
would have to be extended logically to substantive instruc-
tions as well. Jurors would no doubt be intimidated by hav-
ing to explain their understanding of the instructions. More-
over, it would be virtually impossible to attempt to
accurately reconstruct the thought processes of twelve indi-
viduals over a period of time.97 In short, it cannot be done.
The outlook for limited admissibility need not be as bleak
as suggested. Because limited admissibility poses grave
problems when considered as a device for controlling the
jury's thoughts, the concept itself should be rethought.
First, the theory of limited admissibility should be recon-
sidered. It is suggested that limited admissibility may func-
tion as an extremely useful doctrinal bridge between the
older models of evidentiary rules and more modern thought
about evidence. The older rules were dominated by rigid ex-
clusionary approaches that kept the evidence out entirely if
it was susceptible to use for improper purposes. The modern
tendency to admit a greater amount of evidence has been
facilitated by the practice of limited admissibility. In this
way, the concerns of the older exclusionary rules are as-
suaged while allowing the jury to see or hear the evidence.
Limited admissibility, then, masks the tensions bound up
with the development of evidence law from a system of ex-
clusionary rules to one moving ever closer to the Benthamic
ideal of a system of "free proof."98 It also represents our
first serious flirtation with rules of proof as opposed to rules
of admissibility. Unlike an exclusionary rule, which simply
decides what may come in through the gate of admissibility,
rules of limited admissibility purport to instruct the jury
97. One way to do this would be to tape record or videotape the deliberations.
This could lead, however, to stilted jury deliberations and the inhibition of candid
free-wheeling discussions concerning the law, the evidence, and even the lawyers
and judges.
98. See W. TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE 28
(1985).
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about what they should do with the evidence once they have
it. The problem is that the judicial system seems to be doing
a bad job of it.
In order to bring practice in line with the theory, limited
admissibility should be approached through three avenues.
First, when the distinction between the permissible and im-
permissible purpose arises from concerns about the trust-
worthiness or reliability of the evidence, the fears justifying
the rule should be explained to the jury in an instruction
which educates them about the dangers.99 When it proves
impossible to draft a meaningful instruction, two other
courses are available: reconsider the parts played by the
judge and lawyers with respect to limited admissibility, or
reconsider the evidentiary rule itself.
Prime attention should be given toward developing limit-
ing instructions that tell the jury not just what they should
99. For example, a recurring problem is the admissibility of post-arrest state-
ments made by accomplices which incriminate the defendant. Although such state-
ments are generally inadmissible unless the accomplice testifies in the defendant's
trial, the Supreme Court has recognized that they can be used even without the
accomplice's testimony if introduced for a relevant non-hearsay purpose. Tennes-
see v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 105 S. Ct. 2078, 85 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1985). In Street,
the Court upheld the admissibility of such a statement to rebut the defendant's
claim that his own "confession" was simply a coerced copy of his accomplice's
confession. The accomplice's statement, then, was not offered or "used" to prove
the truth of the matters asserted, i.e., that the defendant participated in the
murder.
This particular limited use of the evidence creates special problems because it
jeopardizes the defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation. An instruction
to the jury should educate them about the perilous reliability of post-arrest state-
ments by accomplices which implicate a defendant. It should explore the fear, co-
ercion, and bare selfishness which infuse these statements. Finally, the instruction
should literally implore the jury to use this evidence only to assess the circum-
stances surrounding the rendition of the defendant's alleged statement to police;
the jury should not use the accomplice's statement as a substitute for testimony by
the accomplice.
For an example of a suggested instruction that fails badly on all counts, see WIs.
J.I.-CR. 220B:
Evidence has been received of a statement made out-of-court by
_ This evidence is to be considered only for the pur-
pose of rebutting the defendant's testimony that his own confession
was a coerced copy of _ 's statements. It must not be
considered as proof of the facts contained in the statement.
[Vol. 13:781
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do with the evidence, but why they should do it. Instructions
must do more than articulate arcane legal concepts. They
should instead be thought of as "rules of proof," which pro-
vide some guidance to the trier about how to work with the
evidence that has been admitted.
One example is the use of out-of-court statements for
some non-hearsay purpose. An understanding of the distinc-
tion demands a legal education at the very least. Given the
problems and ambiguities that plague even the definition of
hearsay, it is doubtful that a meaningful instruction can be
drafted. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the
hearsay concept should be jettisoned for this reason alone.
Technically, subtle distinctions such as these are still, one
hopes, within the grasp of most lawyers and judges. In de-
ciding whether to admit the evidence for a limited purpose
under these circumstances, the trial judge should assume
that the jury cannot and, therefore, will not use the evidence
for the permissible purpose only. This "reality" should be
balanced against the probative value of the evidence when
conducting the balancing test. 10 In short, trial judges need
to take a more honest look at the impact that this evidence
will certainly have on the jury.
When the judge decides to admit such evidence knowing
that a jury instruction cannot adequately explain the pur-
ported legal distinctions between what is and is not permis-
sible, the focus of attention should shift to the lawyers. In
particular, the conduct of the attorneys in presenting their
arguments should be closely scrutinized. Limited admissibil-
ity is a charade if the attorney can later do whatever he or
she wants to do with the evidence during the summation.
This is critical because, aside from limiting instructions, the
only other significant guidance given to the jury about how
to use the evidence comes from the attorneys during
argument.
100. See supra the discussion of Rule 403 at text accompanying notes 25-27.
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Closer scrutiny, therefore, should be paid to arguments,
questions, or other statements by counsel bearing on evi-
dence that has been admitted for a limited purpose. Rulings
admitting evidence for limited purposes cannot be effective
if later in the trial the proponent uses the evidence for the
forbidden purpose.
For example, when evidence of a defendant's prior crimes
is introduced either as other act evidence or for impeach-
ment purposes, the critical point is not so much the juncture
at which it is admitted, but the point where the prosecutor
actually uses it-the closing argument. At the time of ad-
mission, the careful advocate will do and say nothing that
might betray an intent, conscious or unconscious, to use the
evidence impermissibly. The "true meaning" of the evidence
for the proponent may not come to light until the closing
argument, which may be the first and only opportunity to
actually "use" the evidence for its intended purpose. 10 Po-
licing closing arguments may require not only certain proce-
dural changes, but a different attitude toward them by the
court and counsel.102 The present practice is one in which
attorneys typically do not object during the closing argu-
ment unless it is virtually a life or death matter. The circle
becomes all the more vicious because a failure to object to
an argument constitutes a waiver even if the court made a
ruling that limited the use of the evidence at the time it was
admitted.
101. See, for example, the confusion demonstrated in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 90 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1986). Lee was tried for murder with a
codefendant. The prosecutor introduced testimony of incriminating post-arrest
statements made by each defendant. Ostensibly, the statements were to be used
only against the defendant who made the statement; they were not to be used
against the respective codefendant. Lee, 476 U.S. at 536-37. In a vivid example of
how futile limited admissibility can be under certain circumstances, the Supreme
Court observed that the prosecutor had confused the contents of the two different
statements in his closing argument.
102. Tanford, Closing Argument Procedure, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 47, 85-90
(1986).
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Finally, in addition to more enlightened instructions and a
more rigorous approach by the bench and bar to evidence
admitted for a limited purpose, a third avenue is open when
appropriate: modify or discard those rules which turn on
distinctions that are so subtle that instructions cannot be
formulated and even lawyers cannot be expected to appreci-
ate the distinctions within the context of trial.
Probably the best example is Rule 703. The rule is useful
and should be retained insofar as it recognizes the reality
that expert opinion will necessarily be based on a great deal
of information, especially hearsay, which is not admitted
into evidence at trial in any formal sense. One should not
continue to carry on the charade that this represents some
sort of evidentiary purpose distinct from the "truth of the
matter asserted."
Rather, the trial judge should determine whether the spe-
cific information has sufficient indicia of reliability to war-
rant being placed before the jury. If so, then the evidence
ought to be formally "admitted. 111 3 When that degree of
reliability in the basis is lacking, then the expert might be
allowed to state the opinion, but not put before the jury the
particulars of the inadmissible basis."14 The point here is not
to resolve the problems caused by Rule 703, but only to
show that other approaches are open to this and similar
problems.
103. In this instance, one need no longer speak of an "inadmissible" basis
within the language of Rule 703. Hearsay problems could be resolved through
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24).
104. See Carlson, supra note 91, at 586 n.29; Federal Rules of Evidence: Fresh
Review and Evaluation 1987 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEc. 72-78 (proposing an amend-
ment to Federal Rule of Evidence 703 strictly curbing the opportunity to put
before the jury any basis for an expert opinion which is not independently
admissible).
19891 823
HeinOnline  -- 13 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 823 1989-1990
824 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
VI. Conclusion
Limited admissibility is an integral part of the modern
law of evidence. It provides the theoretical foundation neces-
sary to allow juries to see and hear evidence which would
have been excluded under the old common law rules of ex-
clusion. Present practice, however, suffers from the existence
of limited admissibility only because of the widely dispar-
aged fiction that juries follow limiting instructions.
The doctrine of limited admissibility needs to be reconsid-
ered so that it can be more fully and effectively utilized and
so that the bogus fiction about jury instructions is elimi-
nated. Limited admissibility should be properly appreciated
as focusing on problems of proof and weight, not problems
of admissibility.
In addition to the theoretical ramifications of reconsider-
ing the doctrine, it needs procedural retuning as well. Jury
instructions should be redrawn so that they truly educate
the jury about how to use the evidence. Discarding the fic-
tion that juries follow the sort of limiting instructions that
are commonly used at present will also require a different
attitude by the courts toward admitting such evidence and a
modification of closing argument practice and procedure.
[Vol. 13:781
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